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RACE, ECONOMIC CLASS, AND 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
TRINA JONES* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Of the 146,047,000 civilians in the U.S. labor force in 2007, approximately 
82% identified themselves as White, 11% as Black or African American, 14% 
as of Hispanic or Latino/a ethnicity, and 5% as Asian.1 That year, the median 
household income for all racial groups was $50,233.2 With a poverty threshold of 
$21,027 for a family of four,3 the median income figure seems to suggest that 
many Americans, at least until the recent economic crisis,4 were making do.5 Yet 
a closer look at the data reveals a sobering reality, one of persistent economic 
inequality. In the United States, income distribution is highly concentrated at 
the top, with the top 1% of the population earning more than 20% of all income 
and the top 10% earning almost half of all income.6 Moreover, notwithstanding 
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 1. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employed Persons by Occupation, Race, 
Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, and Sex, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat10.pdf (last visited July 26, 2009). 
The sum of employees categorized by racial and ethnic group exceeds the total number of employees 
because the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, some people who identify as Hispanic 
or Latino (an ethnic category) might also identify racially as White or Black. 
 2. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Household Income Rises, Poverty Rate Unchanged, 
Number of Uninsured Down (Aug. 26, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/ archives/income_wealth/012528.html. 
 3. U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Thresholds for 2007 by Size of Family and Number of Related 
Children Under 18 Years, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh07.html (last visited 
July 26, 2009). 
 4. See, e.g., America’s Bank Bail-out: Dashed Expectations, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2009, at 83 
(discussing the Obama Administration’s efforts to bailout the banking industry); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Signing Stimulus, Obama Doesn’t Rule Out More, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009 (commenting on an 
economic stimulus bill to jump-start the ailing U.S. economy). 
 5. Of course, using the poverty threshold as a comparative basis for assessing how well Americans 
are faring is problematic because it is difficult to imagine a family of four living on $21,027 a year. 
 6. David Cay Johnston, Income Gap is Widening, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at C1 
(reporting statistics based on data from 2005); see also JULIA ISAACS, ISABEL SAWHILL & RON 
HASKIN, GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 27–29, 47–57 
(2008), available at http://economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/PEW_EMP_GETTING_AHEAD.pdf 
[hereinafter Mobility Project] (reporting that income and wealth inequality has been increasing since 
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the rags-to-riches fairytales that have captured the imaginations of so many 
Americans,7 the likelihood of moving from the bottom to the top is small.8 The 
situation is worse for people of color. Despite measurable progress within some 
subgroups,9 people of color still tend to earn significantly less than their White 
counterparts;10 they tend to be segregated into lower-paying and lower-status 
occupations;11 they tend to be unemployed at a substantially higher rate than 
Whites;12 and they are twice as likely to be impoverished as Whites.13 
These facts indicate that a sizable portion of the U.S. population exists in a 
state of frightening vulnerability, a condition that is no doubt heightened during 
times of economic transformation, downturn, or recession.14 This paper explores 
 
the 1970s and noting that the concentration of assets at the top of the income distribution has been 
growing since at least 1989). 
 7. Some of these fairytales are fueled by fictional stories, and others are driven by real-life events. 
See, e.g., Disney, Cinderella, http://disney.go.com/vault/archives/characters/cinderella/cinderella.html 
(last visited July 26, 2009) (describing the storybook tale of Cinderella); Todd Leopold, ‘Slumdog’ 
Makes History, Sweeps Oscars, CNN, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/SHOWBIZ/Movies/ 
02/23/oscar.night/ (reporting on the success of the film Slumdog Millionaire); People, Oprah Winfrey: 
Snapshot, http://www.people.com/people/oprah_winfrey (last visited July 26, 2009) (summarizing the 
life story of Oprah Winfrey). 
 8. See ISAACS ET AL., supra note 6, at 7. 
 9. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 9–10 (2004) (describing “two Black Americas”—one that is on the path to 
economic prosperity and one that continues to face significant barriers to economic opportunity). But 
see MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 94–99 (2006) (describing the fragility and marginality of the Black middle 
class). 
 10. In 2007, Black households had the lowest median income of all races, which was 62% of the 
median for non-Hispanic White households. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf. Asian households had the highest median income of 
all races, which was about 120% of the median for non-Hispanic White households. Id. And the median 
income for Hispanic households was 70% of the median for non-Hispanic White households. Id. Of 
course, household income is influenced by the size of the household and the number of earners in it. 
This has led some commentators to observe that the number for Asian households is misleading 
because it fails to account for Asian American families’ having more workers per household than White 
families. Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1262–63 (1993). Use of national averages is 
also problematic with regard to the Asian American population because Asian Americans live in 
geographical areas that have higher incomes and higher costs of living. Id. 
 11. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES, 
EMPLOYED PERSONS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR LATINO 
ETHNICITY 212, available at http:// www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf. 
 12. In 2007, the unemployment rate was 4.1% for Whites, 8.3% for Blacks, 3.2% for Asians, and 
5.6% for persons of Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Household Data Annual Averages, Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population by 
Age, Sex, and Race, http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm. (last visited July 26, 2009). 
 13. In 2007, the poverty rate was 8.2% for non-Hispanic Whites, 24.5% for Blacks, 10.2% for 
Asians, and 21.5% for Hispanics. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, P60-235, Income, 
Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007 12 (2008), http:// 
www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf. 
 14. Poor people, people of color, and young workers are often the hardest hit during economic 
slowdowns. Floyd Norris, Younger Job-Seekers Have It Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2008, at B3. The 
recent recession has significantly affected the administrative support, manufacturing, and construction 
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some of the factors contributing to this vulnerability by examining the interplay 
between race and class15 in the employment setting. Part II considers historical 
and contemporary forces leading to workforce stratification in the United States 
and highlights some of the ways in which people of similar economic statuses 
have been differently situated due to their race and the ways in which racially 
similar people have been differently situated due to their economic class. Part 
III assesses existing challenges to socioeconomic mobility in the United States. 
Part IV explores the potential for labor law and antidiscrimination law to 
ameliorate existing disparities. Importantly, my goal in this paper is not to 
propose policy recommendations or a “new paradigm” for thinking about 
racism, classism, and hierarchy. My purpose is merely to examine contemporary 
employment problems through a broader historical lens as we collectively 
attempt to unravel (or at least to understand) more threads in the tapestry that 
is inequality in America. 
II 
U.S. WORKFORCE STRATIFICATION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Much of the socioeconomic stratification in the United States has historical 
roots. From its inception in the seventeenth century, the U.S. economy required 
laborers to work the fields of the South, to build the cities of the North, to 
facilitate western migration, and ultimately, to develop the West. Often where 
one wound up in the labor hierarchy was not a result of historical accident, but 
rather of design.16 It is impossible to offer a nuanced account or to even 
summarize the entire history of labor in the United States in a few pages. Thus, 
this paper focuses on three aspects of that history—indentured servitude, 
slavery, and nineteenth-century Chinese and Japanese immigration—in an 
attempt to highlight the early interplay of race and class in determining access 
to opportunity and to suggest ways in which that early history may augment 
understanding of present conditions. The analysis is regrettably incomplete, for 
 
industries, which tend to have more lower-wage workers. Commissioner’s Statement on the 
Employment Situation: Testimony Before J. Economic Comm., 111th Cong., 2 (Feb. 6, 2009) (statement 
of Keith Hall, Commissioner of Bureau of Labor Statistics), available at http:// 
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/jec.pdf; see also BUREAU OF LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DETAILED 
INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT RANKED BY CHANGE BETWEEN FEBRUARY AND MARCH 2009 (2009), 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.tab2.txt (showing recent declines in employment by industry sector); 
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty, Trends for Selected Groups, http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/poverty/trends.html (last visited July 26, 2009) (“In the past, the poverty rate and number of 
people in poverty have gone up during and slightly after a recession.”). 
 15. Although race is increasingly being understood and accepted as a social construction, the 
definition of class is much less clear. See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1487, 1493–97 (2000) (discussing race as a social construction). For various understandings 
of the meaning of class, see Deborah C. Malamud, “Who They Are—Or Were”: Middle-Class Welfare in 
the Early New Deal, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2019–26 (2003); Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in 
American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 817 (2003); 
Deborah Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847, 1852–
93 (1996). 
 16. See discussion infra III and IV. 
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it does not explicitly consider the experiences of numerous groups (notably 
indigenous peoples,17 Mexicans and Mexican Americans, and other Latino/a 
immigrant populations) whose stories form an essential part of the fabric of 
U.S. history and contemporary life. 
A. Indentured Servitude 
Demand for labor was high during the colonial era, and the nature of this 
demand varied depending upon location. In the Chesapeake and southern 
colonies, the market was dominated by tobacco and rice production.18 In areas 
with harsher climates, such as the Northeast, cash crop production was not 
fruitful, and inhabitants relied upon traditional agriculture, fishing, and 
maritime trades.19 The bulk of colonial labor needs, particularly in the South, 
were met by two sources: indentured servants and slaves. 
At least one half of all immigrants during the colonial era were indentured 
servants.20 Most were poor and emigrated from various European countries, 
including England, Scotland, and Ireland21 to Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 
Virginia.22 To finance their passage from Europe to North America, these 
individuals sold their labor through contract or indenture for a period of usually 
four to seven years.23 
Scholars debate the extent to which living conditions were harsh for 
indentured servants in North America.24 Although conditions likely varied from 
person to person, for the most part servants were treated as articles of 
 
 17. For additional reading on the history of American Indians, see WARD CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE 
FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE, AND 
COLONIZATION (2d rev. ed. 2002); WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: 
HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS 1492 TO THE PRESENT (1998); and materials collected in 
JUAN PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA P. HARRIS, JEAN STEFANCIC & STEPHANIE WILDMAN, 
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 179–84 (2d ed. 2007). 
 18. ERIC ARNESEN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. LABOR AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 281 (2007). 
 19. Id. at 282–83. 
 20. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of 
Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 752–53 (summarizing estimates of the size of the indentured servant 
population); Alfred Brophy, Law and Indentured Servitude in Mid-Eighteenth Century Pennsylvania, 28 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 69, 70 (1991). 
 21. Bilder, supra note 20, at 754–57. 
 22. Id. at 754 (reporting that eighty-eight percent of indentured servants went to Pennsylvania, 
Maryland and Virginia, around eight percent went to New York, and only a negligible percentage went 
to New England). 
 23. Id. at 755. These early White laborers can be divided into three categories: indentured servants 
(who were bound by indentures for a specific length of time in exchange for transport from Europe), 
redemptioners (those who migrated without paying some or all of their passage and who were given 
time after their arrival to pay the fare before being subject to an indenture), and transported convicts 
(whom the British government paid to have transported to the colonies). Id. at 754–56; Brophy, supra 
note 20, at 85–86. However, the “[l]egal regulation of the lives of indentured servants was remarkably 
similar despite variations in the time, place, and manner of entry. . . .” Bilder, supra note 20, at 757. 
 24. See Brophy, supra note 20, at 72–75 (summarizing the debate between social historians, who 
view indentured servitude as “a harsh institution that exploited the labor of immigrant servants,” and 
economic historians, who view servitude as “a rational, essentially benign system that enabled 
immigrants to finance their voyage to the colonies”). 
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commerce,25 and their freedom was restricted during the terms of their 
indentures. For example, laws restricted trade with servants, barred servants 
from marrying and fornicating,26 regulated their sale or transfer, and penalized 
runaway servants and anyone assisting them.27 
The extent to which indentured servants were socially mobile after the 
expiration of their contracts is uncertain due in part to a dearth of historical 
records and a lack of clarity in those that do exist.28 But North America in the 
seventeenth century was a region in transition, and European imperialism and 
expansion through, among other things, theft, genocide, and violence, presented 
opportunities for Whites to amass land and wealth. Undoubtedly some 
indentured servants benefitted in this moment of economic expansion.29 It 
would be reasonable to conclude, however, that many, even among those who 
eventually prospered, were hampered by stereotypes associated with so-called 
“inferior classes”—for example, beliefs that they were lazy, dirty, of limited 
intelligence, and of questionable morality. In this sense, indentured servants 
were not as well positioned as those Whites who came to colonial America with 
money and skills, and for whom the American Dream was possible. 
Although they were not as well situated as wealthy Whites, indentured 
servants were not in the same class as Black slaves. Indentured servants were, to 
be sure, limited by class differences and the practical and psychological 
consequences of those differences. But they remained empowered to some 
extent by White racial privilege. After their contracts expired, they were “free” 
with all the power that the distinction between “free” and “enslaved” entailed. 
They could marry, buy land, relocate geographically, and, without the visible 
marker of race, move freely among and establish connections with the broader 
White community. In addition, many indentures provided for skills training 
during their terms and for the payment of freedom dues (for example, an 
allotment of money or land) upon their expiration.30 When these contractual 
provisions were honored, indentured servants emerged from their indentures 
 
 25. See generally Bilder, supra note 20. 
 26. Apparently, the prohibitions on fornication were to minimize the loss of female servants’ time. 
See Brophy, supra note 20, at 80–81. 
 27. See id. at 77–82, 104–05 (examining the law of Pennsylvania). 
 28. See id. at 116–17 (noting problems with Pennsylvania records). 
 29. Indeed, Professor Brophy reports that in the seventeenth century, many ex-indentured servants 
went on to own land. However, they acquired significantly less property than the average free person, 
and opportunities to own land became more limited by the eighteenth century as wealth became less 
distributed across the population and more concentrated in the hands of a few. Even so, ex-indentured 
servants’ opportunities to advance in the eighteenth century are subject to debate. According to 
Pennsylvania tax records, ex-servants rarely stayed in the same area for long, and many migrated from 
eastern to western Pennsylvania, where they obtained land and became quite successful. The mere fact 
they appeared on tax records indicates some degree of wealth. The stories of success are tempered, 
however, by stories of tragedy. Though able to find employment as unskilled laborers, some ex-servants 
were unable to pay their debts and wound up in prison. And servants who remained in eastern 
Pennsylvania struggled to obtain land due to stiff competition and were too poor to pay taxes. Id. at 
115–22. 
 30. Id. at 76, 113. 
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with essential basics on which to build independent livelihoods. Thus, the 
distinction between White servitude and Black bondage was sizable. Indeed, 
this distinction, and the psychological benefits it afforded even the poorest 
Whites, may have impeded the development of cross-racial coalitions that could 
have significantly ameliorated the sharp effects of economic and racial 
dominance in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America.31 This distinction, 
and the salience given to it, may also explain, in part, why European commerce 
in Whites ended in 1819,32 much earlier than the trans-Atlantic slave trade.33 
This history not only shows that class hierarchy existed from the founding of 
this country, it also underscores that the White community has never been 
monolithic. Economic status differentiated members of this community from 
the beginning. Although most indentured servants were White and enjoyed 
some of the benefits typically afforded Whites, some were denied full access to 
White privilege because of their low economic status. In other words, their 
economic status muted the power and influence usually associated with their 
race. 
The interplay between race and class in contemporary America is arguably 
similar:34 many poor Whites35— who are unfortunately caricatured pejoratively 
as “poor White trash” (PWT), “trailer trash,”36 “rednecks,”37 and “crackers”38—
 
 31. See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1741–44 (1993) 
(“[Historically,] White workers perceived that they had more in common with the bourgeoisie than 
with fellow workers who were Black.”). 
 32. Bilder, supra note 20, at 754. Historian John Hope Franklin notes that indentured servants 
were never an ideal solution to colonial labor needs because, among other things their supply was 
inadequate, many ran away and could not be easily apprehended because their color did not distinguish 
them from other Europeans, and their limited terms of service meant that a master’s labor supply 
would constantly fluctuate. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO 
FREEDOM 39 (8th ed. 2006). 
 33. The slave trade was supposed to end in the United States in 1807, but historians report that it 
continued well in to the mid-1800s. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 32, at 128–37. 
 34. I am not attempting to draw a causal connection between indentured servitude and the 
economic status of poor Whites in the United States today. Rather, I am merely using snapshots to 
show how the interaction of race and class can operate to situate subclasses. 
 35. In contemporary America, poor Whites are sometimes stereotyped as rural. James B. Wadley 
& Pamela Falk, Lucas and Environmental Land Use Controls in Rural Areas: Whose Land Is It 
Anyway?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 331, 338–39 (1993). Rural people are generally “considered to be 
less adept at dealing with the intricacies of modern life. Rural people are simple, uncultured, redneck, 
but certainly not urbane, or sophisticated. Rural people are also viewed as low key, laid back, and 
unmotivated.” Id. John Hartigan notes that this stereotype traces back to colonial America, observing, 
“In colonial records and travelogues attention is given to a subgroup of Whites considered 
constitutionally distinct from the majority of colonists, either by their lack of hygiene or by their 
willingness to shed most remnants of European behavioral standards for being ‘civilized.’” John 
Hartigan, Jr., When Americans Are a Minority, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES 105–
06 (Larry L. Naylor ed., 1997). Privileged Whites viewed these individuals with contempt and believed 
that they should be “discouraged or prevented from gaining access to social privileges.” Id. at 106. 
 36. “White trash” is a “disparaging term for a poor white person or poor white people,” 
particularly those “perceived as being lazy and ignorant.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1963 (4th ed. 2000). 
 37. “Redneck” is a “disparaging term for a member of the white rural laboring class, especially in 
the southern United States.” Id. at 1464. For legal disputes involving the term, see Payton v. Kearse, 
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are denied the socioeconomic benefits afforded to other more prosperous 
members of the White race. Insofar as these poor Whites lack access to 
education, health care, jobs, and home-ownership, the fact that they are 
White—to the extent that Whiteness connotes status, influence, and economic 
power39—loses much of its force.40 
B. Slavery 
Like indentured servants, the first significant number of African slaves 
arrived in colonial America in the seventeenth century.41 The two groups share 
some similarities. Both were poor and were treated as articles of commerce. 
 
329 S.C. 51, 56–57 (1998) (striking White juror because she was a “redneck” was not valid race-neutral 
reason on its face); Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding a 
t-shirt manufacturer violated comedian’s trademark rights in the phrase “you might be a redneck” and 
copyright rights in his redneck jokes). 
 38. “Cracker” is a “disparaging term for a poor white person of the rural, especially southeast 
United States.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 
37, at 424. For a general discussion about stereotypes and these offensive terms, see Debra Lyn Bassett, 
Distancing Rural Poverty, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 3 (2006), and Debra Lyn Bassett, The 
Rural Venue, 57 ALA. L. REV. 941 (2006); Hartigan, supra note 35, at 106. 
 39. On the privilege of Whiteness, see CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE 
MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). On the privilege of Whites not to see 
themselves in racial terms, see Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race 
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969–82 (1993). 
 40. To be sure, Whiteness is not rendered entirely impotent. When poor Whites encounter poor 
people of color, the former may still attempt to wield the psychological benefits of Whiteness. And as 
between the two, privileged Whites may still prefer poor Whites to poor Blacks. Yet, if economic status 
can so diminish the power of Whiteness, then one might legitimately ask are poor Whites still White or 
are they “operatively” or “functionally” Black? And similarly, are upper-class Blacks now operatively 
White because their wealth tempers negative stereotypes associated with Blackness? See Audrey G. 
McFarlane, Operatively White?: Exploring the Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of 
Black Middle-Classness; 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163 (Fall 2009). Although this idea is 
intellectually intriguing and engaging, it seems to minimize the psychological influence of race and to 
ignore the ways in which race has obstructed the formation of cross-racial coalitions among those who 
may have most benefited from them, poor Blacks and Whites. See john a. powell, The Race and Class 
Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW & INEQ. 355, 417–19 (2007) (discussing the difficulties of 
building cross-racial coalitions, noting that “[s]olidaristic approaches are difficult because their long-run 
power is often insufficient to outweigh the advantages groups currently enjoy. Today, Whiteness and 
the tangible benefits of White space prevent working class Whites from allying themselves with poor 
and working-class Blacks who share common interests.”); see also Mahoney, supra note 15, at 804 
(discussing the paradox of “doing race” or “doing class” when the two in fact intersect); Cheryl Harris, 
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1741–44 (1993) (noting that historically “White 
workers perceived that they had more in common with the bourgeoisie than with fellow workers who 
were Black”). The idea also seems to conflate race and economic class and to reify a certain static 
conception of White racial identify and wealth as all powerful and Black racial identity and poverty as 
completely subordinate. Yet social constructions have never been, pardon the pun, this Black and 
White. Are wealthy Black men operatively White when they are unable to secure a taxicab on 
Pennsylvania Avenue at night or when they are profiled by the police in their fancy cars? Is President 
Obama operatively White? 
 41. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 32, at 40–41, 65. Many historians note the arrival of a ship 
carrying twenty Black persons in Jamestown, Virginia in 1619. These individuals could have been slaves 
or indentured servants. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 20–21 (1980). 
Note that Africans were present in the Americas before this date. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 
32, at 40–41. 
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Both were subject to violence and inhumane treatment at the hands of masters 
and employers.42 Like indentured servants, early on some African slaves were 
able to limit their period of bondage, though their mechanism was religious 
conversion as opposed to expiration of an indenture.43 
Notwithstanding these similarities, the experiences of African slaves and 
indentured servants differed in several key respects. First, African slaves were 
forcibly brought to American soil; they did not “choose” bondage.44 Second, 
Africans were, with few exceptions, enslaved for life.45 Third, as racial 
justifications for slavery developed, African slaves were subject to more 
expansive restrictions on their human rights and liberties than indentured 
servants. They were considered barbaric, intellectually limited, morally corrupt, 
oversexed, at times servile and at times savage, and untrustworthy.46 Because 
they were perceived as genetically inferior human beings—if human beings at 
all—they were not entitled to marry, to contract, to obtain an education, to 
acquire and transfer property, to vote, or to serve on juries, among other things. 
These restrictions were not only more expansive in scope, but they applied for a 
longer period of time. Although indentured servitude ended in approximately 
1819, de jure restrictions on African slaves and their progeny continued through 
slavery, the Jim Crow era, and into the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s. Indeed, it was not until well after formal legal barriers were abolished 
that the United States began to witness a burgeoning Black middle class.47 
Today, some Blacks have been able to escape the more pernicious effects of 
racism and are doing well.48 However others continue to suffer from the vestiges 
of centuries of racial oppression. Indeed, poor Blacks are seemingly caught in a 
vicious cycle. Having been deliberately denied access to education and 
professional training, these individuals have been disproportionately tracked 
into unskilled, lower-paying, menial occupations. Because they are forced to 
work longer hours for less pay, they lack both time and resources to pursue 
 
 42. FRANKLIN & Moss, supra note 32, at 39, 138–58.  
 43. Id. at 65–66. 
 44. Although poverty and desperation can circumscribe “choice,” the decision to enter into a 
contract to sell one’s labor is fundamentally different from never having that choice at all. With chattel 
slavery, a critical component of agency, even compromised agency, is missing. 
 45. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 32, at 91–93. 
 46. See George Fredrickson, White Images of Black Slaves (Is What We See In Others Sometimes a 
Reflection of What We Find in Ourselves?), in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE 
MIRROR 38, 38–45 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (examining stereotypes of African 
slaves in the United States); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth 
of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1322–25 (2004) (discussing stereotypes of Black 
slaves). 
 47. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 23–25. Of course, segments of the African American 
community have thrived, though not necessarily to the same extent as Whites, at various points in U.S. 
history. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 32, at 264–71, 312–25 (describing African Americans 
who were elected to public office during Reconstruction and other African American achievements at 
the end of the nineteenth century). 
 48. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 23–25.  
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those educational and professional opportunities that may become available,49 
which means they are effectively trapped in low-status work. This cycle has 
played out over generations. Interestingly, as the United States has moved away 
from state-sanctioned discrimination, what began as systematic discrimination 
against a group has morphed into a belief that Blacks lack individual 
responsibility and are bearing the consequences of their individual choices. In 
other words, in the blame game, Blacks are deemed responsible for their plights 
because they are Black, not because of the myriad structural forces leading to 
inequality. 
Importantly, race and class seem to interact differently with poor Blacks as 
compared to poor Whites.50 Although poverty prevents poor Whites from fully 
accessing White privilege, their poverty is not attributed to their race. Instead, it 
is attributed to aspects of individual character or experience separate from race; 
no causal relationship is presumed between Whiteness and poverty. With poor 
Blacks, however, the opposite is true. Race or Black culture is often blamed for 
Black poverty.51 One argument posits that racial defects supposedly inherent in 
Black people (or Black culture) prevent Blacks from pulling themselves up by 
their bootstraps and accessing the socioeconomic opportunities that are said to 
exist, at least until recently, for all Americans in this land of plenty. In other 
words, because Blacks are lazy, unintelligent parasites, they have not obtained 
the American Dream.52 Somehow, in this deeply troubling and one-sided story, 
race and class become mutually reinforcing. Blacks are poor because they are 
Black and Blackness gets constructed as poor. That is, poverty becomes a 
constitutive element of Blackness. Blacks are not only lazy, intellectually and 
morally inferior, they are also poor.53 
 
 49. See generally Gerald Torres, The Elusive Goal of Equal Educational Opportunity, in LAW AND 
CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 331 (Paul Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006) 
(describing how poverty decreases educational opportunity).  
 50. For analysis of the interaction between race and class with wealthy Blacks and Whites, see 
Trina Jones, Foreword, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (Fall 2009). 
 51. To be sure, the causal relationship is between racism and poverty. See HARRELL R. RODGERS, 
JR., POVERTY AMID PLENTY: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 41–58 (1979) (including racism 
among the five leading causes of poverty); James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty and Federalism: 
1987–1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 541 (1999) (exploring the historical relationship between race and 
poverty). The connection between race, culture, and poverty has sparked heated discussion in recent 
decades. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE 
WAR ON WELFARE 16–43 (1990) (discussing the Moynihan Report and various culture of poverty 
theories). 
 52. Ironically, in this tale group characteristics account for individual failures, yet Blacks are 
individually to blame. 
 53. One must take heed of Ian Haney Lopez’s observation that social constructions are constantly 
shifting and evolving. Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). Indeed, one might question 
whether the construction of Blackness is changing given the arrival of the Oprahs, LeBrons, Chenaults, 
and Obamas. Perhaps the presence of these individuals, and others like them, will challenge the 
contention that poverty is a constitutive element of Blackness and will cause Americans to believe—as 
they seem to believe of Whites—that poverty results from individual attributes, not inherent racial 
characteristics. It seems to me that the jury is still out on this issue. The Oprah cohort may be viewed as 
a form of Black exceptionalism. In other words, they may be seen as exceptions to traditional 
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Nowhere has this interaction between race and class been more evident than 
in the unfortunate caricature of the “Black welfare queen”: the supposedly lazy 
woman of color “who breeds children to fatten her [public] allowance.”54 As one 
author has observed, 
The “welfare mother” is a deviant social creature. She is able-bodied, but unwilling to 
work at any of the thousands of jobs available to her; she is fundamentally lazy and 
civically irresponsible; she spends her days doing nothing but sponging off the 
government’s largesse. Despite the societal pressure to be gainfully employed, she 
enjoys her status as a “dependent” on the state and seeks at all costs to prolong her 
dependency. Promiscuous and shortsighted, she is a woman who defiantly has children 
out of wedlock. Without morals of her own, she is unlikely to transmit good family 
values to her children. She lacks the educational skills to get ahead and the motivation 
to acquire them. Thus, she is the root of her own family’s intergenerational poverty 
and related social ills. She is her own worse [sic] enemy. And she is Black.55 
C. Nineteenth-Century Chinese and Japanese Immigrants56 
The social and economic integration of Asian immigrants in the United 
States offers a counterpoint to the experiences of White indentured servants 
and Black slaves and illuminates the intricacies of race and class. Importantly, 
the histories, cultures, languages, and contemporary circumstances of Asian 
Americans vary dramatically. Because it is impossible to analyze all of the 
unique subgroups within this vastly diverse population of peoples, this paper 
examines a brief moment in the history of two groups whose experiences 
 
conceptions of Blackness rather than as challenges to them. Despite their visibility, the scope of their 
influence may be limited by the fact that these super-wealthy, super-famous individuals represent only 
a small percentage of African Americans. Alternatively, it could be that their presence will spark a 
reshaping of norms. It is too early to tell. 
 54. See Dorothy Roberts, The Value of Black Mother’s Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1996); 
see also Catherine Albiston & Laura Bether Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare 
Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473, 477 (1995) (“The facets of the 
‘welfare queen’ image become fused together so that poor always means black, black always means 
poor, and these characteristics attached to ‘woman’ symbolize sexual irresponsibility, defective 
parenthood, and deviancy.”). Although Blacks are overrepresented on welfare and AFDC relative to 
their numbers in the population, in absolute numbers there are many more Whites than Blacks on 
welfare. Yet in the 1980s the “Black welfare queen” became the poster child for failures of the U.S. 
social-welfare system. See Rose Ernst, Localizing the “Welfare Queen” Ten Years Later: Race, Gender, 
Place, and Welfare Rights, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 181 (2008) (examining the ways in which 
welfare has been racialized); Morgan Doran & Dorothy Roberts, Symposium: Welfare Reform Ends in 
2002: What’s Ahead for Low-Income and No-Income Families? Welfare Reform and Families in the 
Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REV. 386, 402 (2002) (describing the effects of racial stereotypes on 
welfare policy and reform). 
 55. Nathalie A. Augustin, Learnfare and Black Motherhood: The Social Construction of Deviance, 
in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 144 (Adrien Wing ed., 1997); see also Naomi Cahn, Representing Race: 
Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 965, 993 (1997) (“[The 
1996] welfare reforms would affect all poor women, Black and White, and . . . may not appear ‘raced.’ 
Because, however, images of black recipients of welfare seem to motivate welfare reform, and given the 
impact of welfare reform on the black community, a race-conscious lawyering strategy may be 
warranted.”). 
 56. I was greatly assisted in this section by the excellent compilation of materials included in RACE 
AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 17, at 
397–486. 
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demonstrate the ways in which race, class, and U.S. immigration policy have 
worked in tandem in structuring hierarchy. 
1. Chinese Immigrants 
Between 1849 and 1882, approximately 100,000 Chinese laborers 
immigrated to the United States.57 They left China fleeing economic hardship 
and hoping to find greater economic prosperity mining California’s gold fields, 
laying tracks for the transcontinental railroad, and working in other trades, 
including textile production, leather goods manufacturing, and perhaps most 
famously the laundry industry.58 Most planned to work in the United States for 
only three to five years before returning to China.59 
Initially, Americans welcomed these immigrant workers, who were seen as a 
form of cheap and relatively easily controlled labor.60 As their numbers and 
prosperity increased, however, so too did hostility towards them.61 Although 
Chinese immigrants were industrious and peaceful, their communities were 
insular and they preferred to trade with each other.62 In addition, these 
immigrants maintained their own cultural traditions. As one scholar notes, 
“they worked too hard (often for less pay than others were willing to accept), 
saved too much, and spent too little. . . . [T]hey looked and behaved differently 
from the majority population.”63 These differences fueled fires of discontent, 
which found expression in local and national legislation64 that subjected Chinese 
entrepreneurs and laborers to discriminatory taxes and other measures 
designed to close their businesses, to curtail their employment, and ultimately 
to end their migration to the United States.65 
In some ways, Chinese immigrants were racialized similarly to Blacks and 
American Indians. For example, in People v. Hall, the California Supreme 
Court held that Chinese immigrants were prohibited from giving testimony in 
 
 57. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 192–95 (1989). 
 58. Id.; see also CHARLES MCCLAIN, CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW vii (1994). The 
experience of Chinese persons with the laundry industry is widely known in part because of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1886 decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Court 
invalidated a San Francisco ordinance that prohibited the operation of laundries in wooden structures. 
Id. at 374. At the time, three-quarters of the city’s laundries were owned by Chinese persons and 
ninety-five percent of these businesses were in wooden structures. MCCLAIN, supra, at 144–45. 
 59. TAKAKI, supra note 57, at 192–95. 
 60. See Charles McClain, The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The 
First Phase, 1850–1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529, 534–35 (1984). 
 61. Id. at 535. 
 62. Id.; see also CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 10 (1994) (“As a class, [they] were 
harmless, peaceful and exceedingly industrious; but, as they were remarkably economical and spent 
little or none of their earnings except for the necessities of life and this chiefly to merchants of their 
own nationality, they soon began to provoke the prejudice and ill-will of those who could not see any 
value in their labor to the country.” (quoting THEODORE HITTELL, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 99 
(1898))). 
 63. MCCLAIN, supra note 62, at 10. 
 64. For an overview of these legislative efforts, see generally McClain, supra note 60. 
 65. Id. at 539–40. 
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cases in which Whites were parties.66 The court, composed of White justices, 
characterized Chinese immigrants as 
a distinct people . . . whose mendacity is proverbial; a race of people whom nature has 
marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development 
beyond a certain point, as their history has shown; differing in language, opinions, 
color, and physical conformation; between whom and [Whites’] nature has placed an 
impassable difference . . . .67 
Although like Blacks and American Indians, Chinese immigrants were 
considered morally and intellectually inferior to Whites, they posed an 
additional threat because they were also foreign.68 By deeming Chinese 
immigrants ineligible for citizenship, immigration law became a primary vehicle 
through which to exclude them. Starting most notoriously in 1882 with the 
Chinese Exclusion Act,69 the U.S. government passed a series of measures 
restricting access to the United States first by Chinese laborers and later by all 
Chinese persons.70 These measures were effective at excluding Asian 
immigrants, including Chinese persons, until Congress reformed U.S. 
immigration laws in 1965.71 However, as one scholar notes, although the 1965 
 
 66. 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854).  
 67. Id. at 405. 
 68. Justice John Harlan mentioned this distinction in his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 
U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He pointed out that under the Court’s majority opinion, 
Chinese immigrants would actually enjoy greater rights than Blacks in Louisiana—a result that existing 
norms would not support. Id. at 561. He noted,  
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to 
become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, 
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But by the statute in 
question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United 
States, while citizens of the Black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives 
for the preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate in the political 
control of the State and nation, . . . are yet declared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if 
they ride in a public coach occupied by citizens of the white race. 
 69. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (suspending the immigration of Chinese 
laborers to the United States). For additional analysis of the Chinese Exclusion Act and nineteenth-
century restrictions on Chinese immigration, see MCCLAIN, supra note 62, at 147–72. 
 70. See, e.g., The Scott Act, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (permanently excluding Chinese laborers from the 
United States); The Geary Act, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (extending immigration restrictions to all Chinese 
persons and persons of Chinese descent). 
 71. The Chinese Exclusion Act was upheld as constitutional in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
130 U.S. 581, 611 (1889) and was enforced for more than sixty years until it was repealed in 1943. Act of 
Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, §1, 57 Stat. 600. But as the U.S. State Department notes on its website, “the 
repeal . . . was a decision almost wholly grounded in the exigencies of World War II, as Japanese 
propaganda made repeated reference to Chinese exclusion from the United States in order to weaken 
the ties between the United States and its ally, the Republic of China.” See U.S. Department of State, 
Diplomacy in Action, Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943 available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/86552.htm. Few opposed repeal of the act as other measures 
were in place to limit the number of Chinese immigrants to the United States. For example, the 
Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, set an annual quota on the number of immigrants of Chinese 
ethnicity to the United States. Unlike European immigrants, who were limited by country of 
citizenship, the 1924 Act restricted Chinese immigration based on ethnicity. Thus, anyone of Chinese 
ancestry, regardless of whether they were Chinese nationals, was counted under the quota. See U.S. 
Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1943 available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/86552.htm. As the State Department website notes, “[c]reating 
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Act “reshaped the composition of Asian America . . . it did not prove to be a 
panacea” as Asian Americans were subject to many of the racially restrictive 
practices faced by African Americans.72 
2. Japanese Immigrants 
The Japanese immigrant story is similar to that of the Chinese. Immigrant 
laborers from Japan began arriving in the United States in 1885, when 
emigration became legal in Japan.73 Between 1891 and 1924,74 approximately 
200,000 Japanese immigrants came to the United States75 seeking higher wages.76 
Their labor was needed to fill the void caused by the exclusion of Chinese 
workers.77 Most worked in agriculture as farmers and farm workers.78 As 
Japanese immigrants became more successful and sought upward mobility, 
White workers began to view them as an economic threat that needed to be 
eliminated. As early as 1905, hate groups formed “seeking to shut out 
Japanese . . . laborers, to boycott Japanese businesses, to segregate Japanese 
from White children, and to focus national attention on the Japanese menace.”79 
Laws soon followed. In 1907, Japan and the United States entered a 
gentlemen’s agreement in which Japan agreed to deny passports to most 
persons of the laboring class in order to limit the emigration of Japanese 
laborers to the United States.80 In addition, in the early part of the twentieth 
century, several western states passed alien land laws, designed to drive out 
Japanese farmers by prohibiting foreign ownership and leases of land.81 Perhaps 
nothing demonstrates foreignness as a constitutive aspect of Asian racial 
identity more than the internment of thousands of Japanese nationals and 
 
this special, ethnic quota for the Chinese was a way for the United States to combat Japanese 
propaganda by proclaiming that Chinese were welcome, but at the same time, to ensure that only a 
limited number of Chinese actually entered the country.” Id. In the Immigration Act of 1965, Congress 
ended quotas based on national origin and prohibited the use of race, national origin, sex, place of 
birth, or place of residence to determine immigration eligibility. See Act of October 3, 1965, P.L. 89–
236, 79 Stat. 911. 
72. Keith Aoki, Asian Pacific American Electoral and Political Power: Panel 1: A Tale of Three 
Cities; Thoughts on Asian American Electoral and Political Power After 2000, 8 UCLA ASIAN PAC. 
AM. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2002). 
 73. Raymond Leslie Buell, The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States, in 
JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW: THE ALIEN LAND LAWS AND OTHER ISSUES 25, 25–
26 (Charles McClain ed., 1994). 
 74. The 1924 Immigration Act basically ended emigration from Japan. Id. 
 75. Id. at 26. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW: THE ALIEN LAND LAWS AND OTHER ISSUES, 
supra note 73, at ix. 
 79. PEREA ET AL., supra note 17, at 428. For analysis of anti-Japanese sentiment, see generally 
Buell, supra note 73; Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth–Century “Alien Land Laws” 
As a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 44–63 (1998). 
 80. CHAN, supra note 71, at vii–viii. 
 81. Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, in 
JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN LAW: THE ALIEN LAND LAWS AND OTHER ISSUES, supra 
note 73, at 277, 277–78. 
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Japanese Americans following the bombing of Pearl Harbor.82 The Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the internment, reasoning that 
the adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of 
measures for the public safely, based upon the recognition of facts and circumstances 
which indicate that a group of one national extraction may menace that safety more 
than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be 
condemned merely because in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are 
irrelevant.83 
As was true with indentured servants and African slaves, the historical 
interplay between race and class with Japanese and Chinese immigrants is 
fascinating. Japanese and Chinese immigrants initially prospered in the United 
States, and they benefited from racial constructs that are not usually associated 
with poverty. They were viewed as hard working, competitive, industrious, and 
thrifty. Indeed they were ideal workers—that is, until they became too 
successful. Interestingly, their economic prosperity, and the threat that this 
posed, contributed to their negative racialization, and “foreignness” was an 
essential element in this process. As they became more successful, instead of 
ideal workers, these immigrants were viewed as untrustworthy, secretive 
outsiders, out to steal American jobs and to harm American families.84 
A similar dynamic exists today. In times of economic prosperity and labor 
shortages, Asian nationals and Asian Americans (many Americans do not 
distinguish between the two) are welcomed. They are seen as a model minority 
because of their professional success and are praised for being “hard working, 
industrious, thrifty, family-oriented, and[,] for women, seductively mysterious 
and exotic.”85 Yet, in times of economic hardship when Whites and other non-
Asian Americans begin to worry about their jobs, the very success of Asian 
Americans becomes a negative.86 In effect, as one scholar notes, the “model 
minority” becomes a “yellow peril” and “hardworking and industrious becomes 
unfairly competitive; family-oriented becomes clannish; mysterious becomes 
dangerously inscrutable.”87 In this climate, Asian Americans, regardless of their 
citizenship status, become undesirables who are vulnerable to violence and 
backlash. The situation is worse for Asian immigrants. If they are not U.S. 
citizens, they are potentially subject to greater exploitation, increased denials of 
legal protections, and heightened threats of exclusion and deportation. 
 
 82. This history resulted in two of the most infamous cases in U.S. constitutional law: Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 83. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101. 
 84. For discussion of early stereotypes of Chinese and Japanese immigrant workers, see Keith 
Aoki, “Foreign-ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and 
Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 18–34 (1996). 
 85. Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial 
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 296 (1997). 
 86. PEREA ET AL., supra note 17, at 475–86. 
 87. Saito, supra note 85, at 297. Saito notes that “the yellow peril and the model minority are not 
poles, denoting opposite representations along a single line, but in fact form a circular relationship that 
moves in either direction.” Id. at 296 (quoting GARY Y. OKIHIRO, MARGINS AND MAINSTREAMS: 
ASIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 141 (1994)). 
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As the above histories show, race and class interact in different ways 
depending upon context. While race and racial stereotyping can increase one’s 
odds of success, they cannot ensure economic advancement. For example, 
White privilege did not insulate indentured servants from class-based 
discrimination. Race and racial stereotypes, however, can impede economic 
success. Japanese and Chinese immigrants were revered when their labor was 
most needed but shunned when Whites felt threatened by their prosperity. 
Race and class can also be mutually reinforcing in ways that heighten 
inequality. For more than 400 years, Blacks were denied access to both 
educational and occupational opportunities, due at least in part to an 
intermingling of racial and class stereotyping. 
III  
CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
Americans still believe in the American Dream—that each American 
controls his own destiny and that with hard work, discipline, and skill, economic 
prosperity lies just around the corner. Yet, as Part II demonstrates, economic 
stratification among workers has existed in the United States since the colonial 
era. Historical demands for labor and the way in which those demands were 
fulfilled created an economic hierarchy with Blacks, poor Whites, and 
immigrants of color at the bottom. Through no fault of their own, many in these 
groups were unable to achieve the dream. Of course, economic, social, and legal 
conditions have changed. The United States has experienced huge economic 
growth as it has shifted from an agrarian, to an industrial, and most recently to a 
service and technology-based economy. Immigration restrictions have relaxed 
(at least for some). The country has witnessed both the African-American 
movement for civil rights and a war on poverty. Indeed, the son of a poor White 
woman and a Black man is now President of the United States, and the 
descendent of slaves is First Lady. In light of these changes, some might 
question to what extent history continues to affect the social mobility of 
Americans today. 
A 2008 study funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts examined the influence 
of family background on the overall distribution of income and wealth in the 
United States.88 The researchers concluded that the “view that America is ‘the 
land of opportunity’ does not entirely square with the facts.”89 To be sure, for 
the most part, each successive generation of Americans has done better than 
the previous generation.90 That is, over the course of U.S. history, the rising 
economic tide has tended to lift all boats. It is, also true, however, that income 
inequality has risen since the late 1960s.91 There is more space between those at 
 
 88. See generally Mobility Project, supra note 6. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. at 27–32. 
 91. Id. 
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the top and those at the bottom, and people at the higher end of the economic 
hierarchy tend to improve their economic positions at a faster rate, and with 
greater success, than those at the lower end.92 In other words, the tide has not 
lifted all boats equally.93 In addition, although there is some opportunity for 
individuals to move up and down the economic ladder (including the ability to 
change one’s position on the hierarchy), individual success is partly determined 
by the family into which one is born. For example, the researchers found that 
“42[%] of children born to parents in the bottom fifth of the income 
distribution remain in the bottom, while 39[%] born to parents in the top fifth 
remain in the top.”94 These figures are twice as high as would be expected by 
chance.95 Insofar as “only 6[%] of children born to parents with family income 
at the very bottom move to the very top,”96 it seems the rags-to-riches tale of 
economic prosperity that is so emblematic of the American Dream is for many 
quite illusive. 
The situation is worse for African Americans. Researchers found that the 
“mobility prospects for poor black children are worse than the prospects for 
poor white children.”97 In addition, they determined that the “majority of black 
children born to middle-income parents in the late 1960s have less family 
income than their parents did. In short, they have been downwardly mobile.”98 
The researchers concluded that the “failure of middle-income black families to 
pass their advantages on to their children does not suggest that racial economic 
gaps will close any time soon.”99 
Importantly, the researchers also confirmed the value of education to social 
mobility, noting that a “college degree is increasingly the ticket to improving or 
maintaining one’s relative position in the economy.”100 Unfortunately, American 
schools do not adequately promote economic mobility among poor people and 
people of color. The researchers’ examination of education in the United States 
revealed that “the average effect of education at all levels is to reinforce rather 
than compensate for the differences associated with family background and the 
many home-based advantages and disadvantages that children and adolescents 
bring with them into the classroom.”101 Again, the researcher’s predictions were 
 
 92. Id. at 16. 
 93. This is important because if there were little income inequality in the United States, then where 
one stands in the economic hierarchy would be of little moment. But in times of high income inequality, 
where one stands in the hierarchy is tremendously important. 
 94. Mobility Project, supra note 6, at 4. The researchers also found that the stickiness at the top 
and bottom of the income distribution does not exist for children born into middle-income families, 
who “have roughly an equal shot at moving up or moving down and of ending up in a different income 
quintile than their parents.” Id. 
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Id. at 7, 19. 
 97. Id. at 5; see id. at 71–79 (comparing economic mobility among Blacks and Whites). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 71–79. 
 100. Id. at 7; see id. at 91–104 (examining the impact of education on economic mobility). 
 101. Id. at 7. 
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grim: “There is no reason to expect change in the disappointing effects of 
education on economic mobility unless effective reforms are pursued at all 
levels.”102 
It might very well be impossible to track the intergenerational mobility of 
specific groups over the last four centuries or to know precisely to what extent 
the above outcomes result from historical forces. It would not be unreasonable, 
however, to conclude that history plays some role. As noted earlier, education, 
work, and poverty operate in a vicious cycle: lack of educational opportunity 
leads to lower status work;103 lower status work leads to lower wages; lower 
wages lead to an inability due to time and resource restrictions to secure a 
better education.104 To the extent that some groups’ access to education has 
historically been limited by poverty or discrimination, absent some form of 
large-scale intervention, the cycle simply repeats itself. The question becomes to 
what extent, then, has the law served as a disruptive force? 
IV  
LEGAL INTERVENTION 
Both employment discrimination law and labor law exist to protect workers. 
Employment discrimination law seeks to shield employees from the effects of 
arbitrary and harmful decisions based on status markers (for example, race, 
religion, national origin, sex, age, disability), whereas labor law—specifically its 
crown jewel, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—aims “to create a 
system of industrial democracy to replace the master–servant relationship with 
a more egalitarian relationship between employers and employees.”105 
Importantly, both labor and anti-discrimination laws are limited by the 
sociopolitical context in which they operate. In recent decades, unionization has 
declined as the United States has shifted from a manufacturing to a service 
economy.106 Other macroeconomic forces like residential segregation, global 
competition, economic recession, and a failing system of public education also 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Gerald Torres, supra note 49, at 332–35 (examining the link between class status and 
educational opportunity). 
 105. Julius G. Getman, Law at the Workplace: The Decline of Collective Bargaining, in LAW AND 
CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR, supra note 49, at 244. 
 106. In 2008, 12.4% of workers were union members. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Economic News Release, Union Members Summary, Jan. 28, 2009, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. This is down from a rate of 20.1% in 1983, the first 
year in which comparable data are available. Id. The percentage of employees in the United States 
represented by unions has declined from a peak in the early 1950s of approximately 36% of the 
workforce. See Right-to-Work Advocates Mark Labor Day with Calls for Repeal of National Labor 
Law, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-11 (Sept. 2, 2005). For examination of the effects of global 
competition on unionization and domestic labor protections, see David M. Trubek & Lance Compa, 
Trade Law, Labor, and Global Inequality, in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD 
WAR, supra note 49, at 217, 220–22. 
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affect employment opportunity.107 Yet neither traditional labor law nor 
employment discrimination law are designed to address these factors. 
Labor and employment discrimination law are also limited by divisions 
within the populations they serve. Historically, organized labor has been 
notoriously hostile to immigrants, fearing that lower immigrant wages will drive 
down the wages of native workers.108 In addition, some White workers have 
historically been resistant to the social and economic progress of Blacks.109 
These dynamics are important because they have likely impeded formation of 
the sort of broad-based coalitions for change that are necessary to protect the 
rights of all workers. 
Although this larger context is crucial to the overall picture, the question 
examined in this Part is narrower: within the realms in which labor and 
employment discrimination law operate, have these laws failed poor workers 
generally, and Blacks and immigrants of color more specifically? The answer 
requires examining both labor law and antidiscrimination law. 
A. Labor Law 
1. Interpreting the NLRA 
During the Great Depression, Congress passed the NLRA (also known as 
the Wagner Act).110 Unlike other New Deal legislation,111 the NLRA did not set 
forth substantive protections for workers. Rather, it envisioned a new process 
through which workers could use their collective strength to negotiate with 
employers for greater economic power and security.112 The process, known as 
collective bargaining, worked for some time. Motivated by a desire to avoid 
strikes and time-consuming grievances, employers negotiated with unions to 
develop substantive rules to govern the employer-employee relationship. By the 
 
 107. For an overview of factors contributing to labor’s decline, see CHARLES CRAVER, CAN 
UNIONS SURVIVE? 34–55 (1993); MICHAEL GOLDFRIED, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN 
THE U.S. 94–112 (1987). 
 108. See Catherine Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 401–02 (Laura Cooper & Catherine Fisk eds., 2005) (describing 
labor’s attitudes toward immigrant workers); Jose Bracamonte, The National Labor Relations Act and 
Undocumented Workers: The De-Alienation of American Labor, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 32–35 
(1983–84) (examining historical tensions between labor and immigrant workers); Jennifer Hill, 
Binational Guestworker Unions: Moving Guestworkers Into the House of Labor, 35 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 307, 308–09 (2008) (describing the historical resistance of unions to guest workers). This resistance, 
however, may be weakening. Fisk & Wishnie, supra, at 401; Hill, supra, at 309. 
 109. See supra note 40; see also Deborah C. Malamud, The Story of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad, in LABOR LAW STORIES, supra note 108, at 59 (describing White hostility toward Black 
workers in the railroad industry in the 1930s); Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking 
Unions, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 211, 228–29 (2002) (arguing that organized labor’s colorblind 
vision of organizing poorly serves immigrants and people of color). 
 110. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
 111. See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
301–1397jj (2006); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006). 
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
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1960s, unions were able to provide workers with greater protection from 
arbitrary terminations, mandatory overtime hours, and unfair job assignments, 
among other things.113 
Yet, as numerous scholars have noted,114 a process that looked encouraging 
for a time seems to be failing today.115 Unionization in the United States has 
declined significantly in recent decades.116 To be sure, outsourcing and global 
competition, among other things, are part of the challenge.117 But the crisis with 
unionization is not due solely to such factors. Part of the problem is that the 
NLRA has been narrowly construed in ways that are adverse to workers. In a 
brief but insightful essay, Professor Julius Getman asserts that this is because 
judges charged with interpreting the statute “rarely came from the working 
class, and rarely understood union organizing, collective bargaining, grievance 
arbitration, or the dynamic of strikes.”118 As a result, they have decided a series 
of cases that “undervalue collective bargaining, . . . weaken the right to strike, 
and reflect a basic misunderstanding of the arbitration process.”119 
Getman cites three Supreme Court cases, which have also been widely 
criticized by other scholars,120 to demonstrate his point: (1) NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Company,121 (2) Lechmere v. NLRB,122 and (3) NLRB v. Mackay 
Radio.123 In Gissel Packing, the Court held that even if an employer is aware 
that a majority of its employees support a union,124 the employer can refuse to 
recognize the union until a formal election is held.125 The campaign process 
leading up to an election, however, advantages employers due to their superior 
 
 113. Getman, supra note 105, at 244. 
 114. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, “Labor’s Divided Ranks”: Privilege and the United 
Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1553–66 (1999) (arguing that denying gender and racial 
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Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace by Contract Again, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & 
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Among Low-Wage Immigrant Workers: Some Legal Considerations for Organizing Structures and 
Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 405–15 (2004) (proposing alternatives, including 
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 115. See Getman, supra note 105. 
 116. See supra note 106. 
 117. See supra notes 106 and 107. 
 118. Getman, supra note 105, at 247. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Terry Bethel & Catherine Melfi, The Failure of Gissel Bargaining Orders, 14 
HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 423 (1997); Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election 
Outcomes: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court’s Gissel 
Decision, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 87 (1984); Cynthia Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After 
Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and 
the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984). 
 121. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
 122. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 123. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
 124. This can be accomplished through a card check (that is, by checking the number of employees 
who had signed union cards). Gissel, 395 U.S. at 595–610. 
 125. Id. at 609–10. 
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access to and power over employees.126 Importantly, the NLRA does not require 
elections, and until Gissel Packing the general rule was that employers were 
obligated to negotiate with a union once a majority of employees had expressed 
support for the union.127 The old rule equalized the playing field because unions 
could often demonstrate majority status after an initial organizing drive. 
Allowing employers to refuse union recognition and to insist upon a formal 
election, however, tilts the balance in favor of employers.128 Instead of 
neutralizing this advantage by granting unions additional access to employees 
before elections are held, the NLRB and courts have chosen to intervene only 
after failed elections. The remedy in cases of employer abuse has been to set 
aside election results and hold new elections, an approach that is unsatisfactory 
from labor’s viewpoint because “[it] almost always leaves the original result in 
place.”129 
In Lechmere, the Court held that the NLRA does not give union organizers 
the right to distribute literature on company property.130 Getman argues that 
Lechmere illustrates the Court’s tendency to prioritize the property rights of 
employers over the rights of employees to hear the case for unionization, a 
position that “reinforce[s] the employer’s advantage by perpetuating the 
‘outsider’ status of unions.”131 A consequence of Lechmere is that “employees 
will know the case against unionizing better than the case in favor because those 
not making the special effort to attend off-premises union rallies will have 
heard the employer’s case more often and more recently than the union’s.”132 
The third case, MacKay Radio, was perhaps one of the harshest blows the 
Court has delivered to unionization because it undermined the strike, the threat 
of which provided a powerful incentive for employers to engage in collective 
bargaining.133 In MacKay, the Court stated in dicta that employers can 
 
 126. Getman, supra note 105, at 248–49. 
127. Joy Silk Mills, 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1265–66 (1949).  
128.  Getman, supra note 105, at 248–49. Getman notes that an employer knows employee: 
addresses and their work stations. It designates their supervisors and controls their time. It can 
call the employees together whenever it wishes and explain why they should vote against 
unionization. And employees supporting union organization fear reprisals—a fear that almost 
always predates the campaign and can generally be strengthened by it. The employer has the 
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will respond positively if the employees vote against unionization. 
Id. at 248. 
 129. Id. at 251. 
 130. Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 531–35, 539–41 (1992). 
 131. Getman, supra note 105, at 251. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Julius Getman & Thomas Kohler, The Story of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.: 
The High Cost of Solidarity, in LABOR LAW STORIES, supra note 108, at 13, 13 (“After nearly seven 
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permanently replace striking workers.134 The opinion’s significance was not felt 
for decades because employers were reluctant to use replacement workers.135 In 
the 1980s, however, employers began to see that MacKay offered a mechanism 
for “taming or ridding themselves of troublesome unions,”136 and they began 
using it to demand concessions in collective bargaining negotiations. After a 
series of strikes ended poorly for workers in the 1980s, unions came to fear the 
strike and, by the 1990s, use of this device had dropped to an all-time low.137 
Getman’s excellent article points to a number of other developments that 
have harmed labor and caused “unions and their supporters to see courts, the 
Board, and the national law as their implacable opponents.”138 He notes, for 
example, that the courts have placed certain types of employer decisions (such 
as those affecting changes in plant operations)139 outside the scope of collective 
bargaining and in effect have limited employee input into decisions affecting 
their well-being. He also critiques the increased reliance on mandatory 
arbitration, which he argues favors employers when done outside the context of 
collective bargaining.140 He concludes, 
It is ironic that those whom the Act was designed to protect—those with the least 
power in the employer-employee relationship—now carry the burden of protecting 
themselves. We have come full circle so that workers are in about the same position 
they occupied before the Act—perhaps worse—because today workers must 
circumvent barriers posed by the very law that was supposed to protect them.141 
2. People of Color 
Although the above analysis illustrates how labor law has failed workers 
across the board, additional concerns arise regarding people of color. For 
example, it is well known that union leaders have engaged in racially 
discriminatory conduct, and numerous cases have challenged this behavior.142 It 
is also widely known that under the NLRA’s exclusive-representation rule, once 
 
 134. 304 U.S. at 347; see also Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (holding 
that an employer can close down its business, including one part of a multi-location operation, to avoid 
unionization). 
 135. Getman, supra note 105, at 252. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. For additional analysis of MacKay Radio, see generally Getman & Kohler, supra note 133 
(exploring the contemporary effects of permanent replacements on the collective bargaining rights of 
employees). 
 138. Getman, supra note 105, at 256. He notes that “the unions most active in organizing low-wage 
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organizing and in their collective bargaining. They rely instead on the use of raw economic power to 
force employers to grant recognition based on signed authorization cards.” 
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 140. Getman, supra note 105, at 255–56. 
 141. Id. at 257. 
 142. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (challenging the racially 
discriminatory nature of the seniority system and the job assignment process included in a collective 
bargaining agreement); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (challenging efforts 
of White unions to exclude Blacks from certain “White” jobs). 
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a union has been elected by a majority of workers, the union represents all 
employees in the bargaining unit (even those who opposed the union).143 Two 
Supreme Court cases illustrate the nature of the problems that arise when 
racially discriminatory conduct collides with the exclusive-representation rule. 
In Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,144 Black railroad 
firemen sued their union, which was comprised mostly of Whites, for attempting 
to have the collective-bargaining agreement in effect between the railroad and 
the union amended to exclude Black firemen from service.145 The Court held 
that unions have a duty to represent all of their members without discriminating 
on account of race.146 This rule seemed fine, in fact laudable, at the time. The 
problem was: what were union members to do when unions failed to follow it? 
The Supreme Court addressed this question some thirty-one years after 
Steele in Emporium Capwell Company v. Western Addition Community 
Organization.147 In that case, a group of Black department store employees 
alleged that their employer was engaging in racial discrimination.148 Instead of 
following the grievance procedures recommended by their union and 
incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and 
the union, several employees decided to strike, an activity for which they were 
subsequently fired.149 The issue before the Court was whether these employees 
could circumvent the union and negotiate directly with their employer outside 
of the collective bargaining process.150 The Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, said no.151 
The Emporium decision and the exclusive-representation rule have spawned 
much scholarly debate.152 On the one hand, some argue that the rule should be 
abolished because it harms people of color and women “by denying individuals 
the power of self-determination and requiring them to submit their individual 
interests to a collective decisionmaking process.”153 On the other hand, 
supporters of the rule contend that its elimination would harm women and 
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people of color in a different way, by removing incentives to wide-scale, 
inclusive organizing.154 Instead of abandoning the rule, supporters argue for 
reforms focused on encouraging more organization, perhaps by minorities, by 
formalizing “intraunion bargaining structures.”155 
The debate over organized labor’s ability to protect the rights of people of 
color has been heightened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Penn 
Plaza v. Pyett.156 In Penn Plaza, the Court held that if a collective bargaining 
agreement provides for the arbitration of anti-discrimination claims provided by 
federal statutory law, then individual workers may not sue to redress alleged 
violations of that law.157 These arbitration clauses are generally advantageous to 
employers because they limit the potential scope of an employer’s liability. In a 
successful grievance arbitration, the usual remedies are reinstatement and 
backpay. Potential damage awards under federal statutory law, however, are 
broader. For example, under Title VII, in addition to reinstatement and 
backpay, a successful plaintiff may also receive compensatory and punitive 
damages in cases involving intentional discrimination.158 Although employers 
have an incentive to negotiate arbitration agreements that include statutory 
claims, unions may not be similarly motivated because these claims are time-
consuming, expensive to litigate, and difficult to win. In addition, unions may 
also think it in their members’ best interests to be able to file suit in court where 
in addition to higher damage awards, there are greater procedural protections.159 
Oddly, Penn Plaza places unions negotiating collective bargaining agreements 
in an undesirable position, one where either a decision to include or a decision 
to exclude an arbitration clause can be used against it. As Professor Catherine 
Fisk notes, 
Imagine the new anti-union strategy at the organizing phase: An employer says to 
employees, “If you form a union, did you know that you will lose the right to file a suit 
under all the various state and federal laws that provide you individual rights?” Or, 
after a majority of employees vote to unionize and the employer continues to 
campaign against the union, hoping to persuade a majority of employees to vote to 
decertify it: “We want an agreement that protects you against discrimination, and 
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 158. Compensatory and punitive damage awards vary depending upon the size of the employer with 
a maximum award of $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006). 
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we’re negotiating for that. Did you know that your union is negotiating to prevent you 
from arbitrating a claim alleging that someone sexually harassed you?”160 
3. Immigrant People of Color 
The connection between labor and immigration law dates back to colonial 
era rules regarding indentured servants. That connection continues today in 
immigration laws that, among other things, limit the ability of employers to hire 
undocumented persons161 and in immigration reform proposals that highlight 
guest-worker programs162 and legalization based upon work history.163 Although 
labor and immigration law need not conflict,164 they are often viewed that way, 
as a slim majority of the Supreme Court demonstrated in 2002 in Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds v. NLRB.165 In Hoffman, the employer violated the NLRA 
by unlawfully discharging an employee for union organizing.166 The Court held, 
however, that the employer was not liable for backpay because the employee 
was an unauthorized worker under U.S. immigration law and because the 
employer discovered this fact after the illegal discharge.167 The Court reasoned 
that to award backpay to unauthorized workers would thwart the goals of 
immigration law by encouraging unlawful entry.168 
The Hoffman decision has been extensively criticized,169 and rightfully so. 
The decision furthers the goals of neither immigration law nor labor law.170 
 
 160. Catherine Fisk, “Penn” Is Mightier Than Decades of Precedent, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Aug. 
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Instead, it gives employers an incentive to violate both.171 Typically, when an 
employer violates the NLRA, damages may include injunctive relief, backpay, 
and reinstatement, among other things.172 When the wronged employee is an 
unauthorized immigrant, however, Hoffman takes backpay off the table. This is 
not only a substantial reduction in an employer’s sanction, it is also a powerful 
disincentive for harmed workers to pursue discrimination claims, for they 
personally stand to recover very little.173 Because Hoffman renders employers 
practically immune from any real consequence of their actions, it encourages 
unscrupulous employers to hire unauthorized workers, to mistreat them (by 
paying ridiculously low wages and failing to provide safe working conditions), 
and to fire them if they engage in organizing or any other type of behavior to 
protect their rights. This set up not only harms the millions of struggling 
undocumented workers in this country, on whom many U.S. industries depend, 
it hurts all workers by stifling efforts to build broad and effective coalitions 
across immigrant and nonimmigrant populations. Instead of unifying and 
empowering workers through collective action, a dominant theory behind the 
NLRA, the decision fosters division and animus among workers by 
discouraging one segment from participating in protest activity and giving 
employers an incentive to replace with unauthorized workers (or to never hire) 
those who do or can protest. 
Alas, history seems to be repeating itself. Immigrant workers flock to the 
United States to escape poverty at home and to satisfy industry’s demand for 
cheap labor. Some U.S. employers hire and exploit these workers in blatant 
violation of U.S. labor law, and after Hoffman they do so without serious 
adverse consequence.174 Low-wage U.S. workers are left disgruntled because, 
instead of them, U.S. employers appear to be choosing immigrant workers. 
Ironically, their anger is not directed at employers for diminishing the rights of 
all workers, but at immigrants. 
B. Antidiscrimination Law 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964175 and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment176 are two principal sources of protection against 
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workplace discrimination provided by federal law.177 Like labor law, anti-
discrimination law has provided redress for certain subclasses of employees. But 
there are both practical and structural limits to what it can accomplish. 
1. Access to Justice 
For starters, the primary vehicle for vindicating rights through 
antidiscrimination law is litigation. Yet litigation is expensive and time-
consuming, and poor workers rarely have the resources to hire lawyers.178 
Although the government can prosecute cases, it can handle only so many as a 
practical matter, and the number of prosecutions varies, depending upon 
whether a conservative or liberal administration controls the executive. Thus, 
just getting a case filed will pose an insurmountable challenge for many 
workers. 
Even if resources are not an issue, workers might also be prevented from 
having their cases heard in court due to increased judicial tolerance of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. Historically, courts were reluctant to enforce 
these agreements in the employment context, due in part to the power 
differential between employer and employee and the importance of having a 
public forum for adjudication of federal statutory claims. But that hesitancy has 
all but disappeared. In the aftermath of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
courts will readily enforce an employee’s decision to waive judicial 
determination of her rights under federal antidiscrimination law—even though 
many employees are not adequately situated to negotiate the terms of these 
agreements and may not even know of their significance at the time of hire.179 
This unequal bargaining situation is regrettable because, although arbitration 
gives employees some access to dispute resolution (an important concern for 
poor workers), without appropriate safeguards it has the potential to favor 
employers who are often repeat players and who can ensure conditions 
beneficial to themselves. 
2. Constitutional Challenges 
In addition to these practical impediments, poor workers will have difficulty 
bringing antidiscrimination claims based on economic status. Poverty is not a 
 
 177. Section 1981 also provides coverage for claims of racial discrimination in employment. 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2008). Because § 1981 tracks Title VII’s proof structure for the most part, I will not 
examine it separately. Other key federal antidiscrimination laws, which are not pertinent to this 
analysis, are the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. sec. 621, and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). 
 178. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 4 
(2005), available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf (noting that less than twenty percent of the legal 
needs of low-income Americans are being met); see also Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal 
Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L. J. 1529, 1534–58 (1995) (describing the inadequate legal services poor 
people receive). 
 179. 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (compelling judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements in employment 
contracts); see also discussion of Penn Plaza v. Pyett, supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. 
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suspect classification for purposes of equal protection analysis.180 This means 
that class-based distinctions are subject only to rational basis review and are 
presumptively legitimate, with the result that one is unlikely to win a claim on 
this basis.181 
Importantly, race is a suspect classification under equal protection analysis 
and is subject to strict scrutiny, the most exacting level of constitutional review. 
But this level of scrutiny has been more of a hindrance than a help in recent 
years. Since the mid-1970s, equal protection cases involving race, at least at the 
Supreme Court level, have not involved overt discrimination against people of 
color or the use of a racial classification with intent to harm a particular racial 
group. Rather, most cases have involved challenges to affirmative action 
measures designed to secure access for people of color to institutions from 
which they have historically been excluded and in which they are still 
underrepresented.182 Because the Supreme Court has applied an increasingly 
demanding standard of review to these cases, generally these race-based 
measures have failed.183 Indeed, until two recent cases involving admissions 
policies at the University of Michigan,184 the application of strict scrutiny was 
generally understood to mean “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”185 The Court’s 
recent decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1186 may signal that the Michigan cases are anomalies and that with 
the Court’s current composition, race-conscious measures are unlikely to 
succeed in the future. (Oddly enough, because they are subject to a lower level 
of review, class-based affirmative-action measures would likely survive 
constitutional scrutiny.)187 
 Even if race-conscious affirmative action measures were to pass 
constitutional muster, some evidence suggests they might not be helping the 
poorest people of color. One scholar has observed that in university admissions, 
 
 180. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 181. There are three levels of constitutional review. Race-based classifications are tested under 
strict scrutiny, meaning that they receive the highest level of judicial review. Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). To satisfy this standard, a racial classification must serve a compelling 
state interest and be narrowly tailored to that end. Id. at 237. In contrast, sex-based classifications are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny, meaning that a classification must further an important governmental 
objective and the means employed must be substantially related to achievement of that goal. See Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). And finally, class-based distinctions (as well as age, sexuality, and 
disability classifications) are subject to only rational-basis review, or minimal scrutiny. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. at 40. 
 182. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. 200; Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 183. For a summary of the court’s evolving review standard for race cases, see Trina Jones, The 
Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 171, 189–95 (2005). 
 184. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 185. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
 186. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (rejecting plans that used race in an effort to further racial integration). 
 187. For additional analysis of this somewhat counterintuitive result, see Jones, supra note 183, at 
205–06. 
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Blacks who are descendents of slaves do not fare as well as Blacks who are 
biracial or whose families recently immigrated to the United States.188 
Importantly, the latter two groups tend to be more economically well off than 
the former group, which may play a role in the outcome.189 This is not to suggest 
that biracial persons or recent immigrants do not suffer from race 
discrimination or should not benefit from affirmative action; one cannot 
conflate race and class. It merely suggests that additional efforts need to be 
taken if affirmative action measures are to reach the poorest Blacks. 
3. Federal Statutory Challenges 
As with the Equal Protection Clause, the poor are not a protected class 
under federal statutory law; consequently, such law does not provide a basis for 
relief for claims of economic discrimination.190 Although race and national origin 
are protected classifications under Title VII, for reasons set forth below, it is 
exceedingly difficult to win these types of claims. 
a. Race. Under Title VII, litigants may prove their cases in one of two 
ways—through individual or systemic claims. Individual claims require that a 
plaintiff establish an employer’s intent to discriminate.191 Importantly, the 
plaintiff always bears the burden of persuasion on this issue.192 Yet courts have 
demonstrated increasing hostility to employment discrimination claims,193 and 
 
 188. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1165–66 
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 189. Id. at 1154–56, 1165–68. 
 190. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of only race, sex, religion, 
color, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
covers only disability discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) covers only age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
 191. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973). 
 192. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981); Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). 
 193. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Federal Judicial Center, to Hon. Michael 
Baylson (rev. June 15, 2007), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/sujufy06.pdf (showing 
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and seventy-three percent in employment-discrimination cases—the highest for federal civil cases); Pat 
K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
49, 54, 98–99 (2006) (detailing results of empirical study showing that plaintiffs in racial harassment 
cases fare worse than plaintiffs in sexual-harassment cases); Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg 
& Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 566 (2003) (showing that employment-discrimination plaintiffs fare 
poorly on appeal, with a seven percent reversal rate when defendants win at trial compared to a forty-
two percent reversal rate when plaintiffs win at trial); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 239, 245 (2001) (finding that defendants are much 
more likely than plaintiffs to prevail in appellate litigation under the ADA and that plaintiffs in ADA 
cases tend to fare worse than Title VII litigants); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race 
Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889 (2006) (showing that plaintiffs have most 
difficulty winning in race and national origin discrimination cases); Michael Selmi, Why Are 
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557–61 (2001) (showing that 
compared to the average plaintiff, employment-discrimination plaintiffs win a lower proportion of their 
cases during pretrial and after trial). 
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this burden is not easily met in an era when much overt discrimination has gone 
underground, meaning smoking-gun evidence of unlawful motive is not readily 
found. The complicated burden-shifting minuet that litigants must follow has 
only aggravated the problem by making it unclear at times exactly what 
plaintiffs must do to prevail.194 In effect, even if they are able to circumvent the 
access-to-justice issues, plaintiffs will have tremendous difficulty actually 
winning their cases.195 
Systemic claims also involve significant challenges. In systemic cases, 
plaintiffs attempt to prove that either the employer engages in a pattern or 
practice of decision making that adversely affects people of color,196 or that the 
employer uses a facially neutral criterion that has a disparate impact on people 
of color.197 In both types of cases, plaintiffs must show a statistically significant 
disparity between the composition of the employer’s workforce and the 
appropriate comparative labor market.198 Because these claims rely upon huge 
amounts of statistical data and expert proof, they are tremendously expensive 
to litigate, which again presents access to justice difficulties for poor plaintiffs. 
In short, even though Title VII provides relief for claims of racial 
discrimination, plaintiffs will have a tough row to hoe in getting these cases to 
court and in ultimately prevailing on the merits. 
b. Immigrants of color and national-origin discrimination. Although Title 
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin, there are again 
limits to this prohibition. First, the statute does not provide protection on the 
basis of alienage or citizenship.199 Thus, employers can refuse to hire persons 
who are not U.S. citizens as long as they treat all noncitizens equally (that is, 
hiring practices cannot be country-specific). In addition, most national origin 
discrimination happens by proxy. For example, instead of discriminating against 
employees because of their country of origin, an employer may employ an 
 
 194. Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 510–19 (1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework and leading some courts to conclude that evidence of pretext alone may be 
insufficient to establish an inference of discrimination); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (examining the role of 
pretext in establishing intent); see also Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–102 (2003) (supposedly 
clarifying the applicable evidentiary requirements for mixed motive cases). 
 195. See Selmi, supra note 193, at 557–61. 
 196. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–09 (1977) (holding that gross 
statistical disparities alone can constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination). 
 197. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426–28 (1971) (challenging employer’s 
education and intelligence test requirements for perpetuating past discriminatory practices).  Unlike 
pattern and practice cases and individual disparate treatment cases, disparate impact claims do not 
require proof of intent. 
 198. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308–13 (explaining the use of statistics in pattern and practice cases); 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–31 (1977) (explaining the use of statistics in disparate-impact 
cases). 
 199. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) (rejecting claim that refusal to hire on 
the basis of citizenship violated Title VII). 
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English-only or English fluency requirement, which may have the same effect.200 
Yet litigants have encountered resistance when trying to challenge these 
practices, with courts concluding that accent discrimination and English-only 
rules are not facial discrimination and refusing to find that these rules provide 
circumstantial evidence of such discrimination. 
There is, moreover, an open question about the effects of Hoffman on Title 
VII litigation brought by undocumented persons. Hoffman’s holding that an 
employer does not have to award backpay to an unauthorized worker illegally 
discharged for engaging in union activity has implications within the context of 
Title VII.201 If an employer engages in unlawful racial or national origin 
discrimination against an unauthorized worker, can the employer escape 
liability for backpay damages based on the worker’s unauthorized status? Some 
argue that to award backpay in these circumstances would in effect reward the 
worker’s violation of federal immigration law.202 Others argue that to look the 
other way would undermine the objective of ending workplace discrimination 
by employers.203 Yet policy makers need not choose one course over the other. 
Both statutory regimes can be vindicated by awarding backpay while not 
requiring reinstatement of unauthorized workers. Thus, the employer is 
partially sanctioned for its discriminatory behavior (furthering the goals of 
antidiscrimination policy), and the employee is penalized for his unauthorized 
entry (furthering the goals of immigration policy). In the aftermath of Hoffman, 
however, it is unlikely that this approach will prevail—at least not in the short 
term. 
4. Internalized Norms 
As a final caution, all law, whether labor or anti-discrimination, must guard 
against norms that privilege middle- and upper-class workers. An obvious 
example of this is the Family and Medical Leave Act, which provides unpaid 
leave time for workers needing to care for a new child or an immediate-family 
 
 200. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding the effect of an 
English-only rule on Latino employees insufficient to state a Title VII claim); Fragante v. City of 
Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 598–99 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting an accent-discrimination claim under Title 
VII). 
 201. See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text. 
 202. See, e.g., Ecobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896–97 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (dismissing 
backpay claims under Title VII because plaintiff was an undocumented worker at the time of 
employment). 
 203. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) Distinguishing Title VII 
from the NLRA, the statute at issue in Hoffman, the Court noted, 
[I]n Title VII Congress has chosen to rely heavily on private actions that result in the 
imposition of severe remedies, including backpay, in order to deter future discrimination and 
vindicate national policy of the highest priority. It is far from evident to us that Congress 
intended to bar the use of one of the most critical of those remedies in the case of 
undocumented workers who are victims of invidious discrimination. 
For further discussion of this debate, see Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of 
Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1366–71 (2009). 
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member.204 Although the motivation behind the statute is certainly 
praiseworthy, the Act potentially disadvantages poor workers205 because its 
benefits are available only to workers who can afford to take time off without 
pay. As one scholar notes, “[S]ince the Act imposes some costs on employers, it 
probably reduces job opportunities. Therefore, the working poor may share in 
the cost of the Act, but they do not benefit because they cannot afford to take 
an unpaid leave.”206  
V 
CONCLUSION 
I have not sought here to propose solutions to workforce stratification in the 
United States. Rather, I have attempted merely to demonstrate, through 
snapshots, the ways in which race and class have interacted to produce and 
perpetuate socioeconomic hierarchy in this country. White workers, slaves, and 
immigrants of color were all, at various points, stymied in their quest for the 
American Dream. Yet their histories reveal that class functions differently 
depending upon a person’s race and that race operates differently depending 
upon a person’s class. Furthermore, the varying degrees of workplace 
segregation and lack of access to educational opportunity faced by these groups 
pose significant barriers to their social mobility. Although labor and 
antidiscrimination law have played and continue to play an important role in 
reducing some barriers to opportunity, they can do only so much, given 
decreased unionization and increased hostility to discrimination claims. Perhaps 
more critically, many of the problems discussed herein are systemic in nature 
and thus require systemic solutions. Reform in K-12 education is desperately 
needed so that people can obtain the skills required to move up professional 
ranks. Equally essential are affirmative measures to open previously closed 
employment arenas and to ensure that questions of disadvantage and privilege, 
and of discrimination and merit, are kept in the forefront of policy debates. 
And, as other papers in this collection demonstrate, the United States must 
simultaneously tackle a host of other issues, including health-care reform and 
local economic development. Importantly, as the United States moves into the 
future, Americans must continue to look to the past, for history reveals that 
inequality is a complex and evolving tapestry. Its constitutive threads—racism, 
sexism, classism, xenophobia, homophobia, religious intolerance—have been 
seamlessly woven together. To unravel one, we must unravel them all. 
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